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Abstract 
The literature on global land deals or land acquisition has extensively described the possible 
drivers, trajectories, and their impacts. In addition, the concept of a „land grab‟ per se is heavily 
contested and viewed as a work in progress. Many have argued on the topic of inclusive land 
deals without addressing which groups of stakeholders are vested with particular powers and 
interests in the deals. After reviewing this phenomena in contemporary global land deals and the 
stakeholder theory of management developed in the 1980s, this paper proposes a conceptual land 
deal framework. Accordingly, the actors in land deals are characterised and disaggregated into 
2 
 
seven generic groups, i.e., “inactive”, “discretionary”, “exigent”, “dominant”, “dangerous”, 
“dependent”, and “definitive”. The paper concluded that to address the governance challenges in 
land deals, a need exists to resolve conceptualisation deficiencies related to inclusive land deal 
frameworks. Thus, this work suggests that extending the stakeholder theory of management to 
the global governance of transnational land acquisition can significantly aid in resolving 
conceptualisation limitations for inclusive transnational land deals. Hence, a new inclusive land 
deal framework was developed that attempts to integrate the biophysical environment, 
stakeholders, governance, and institutions. Furthermore, this paper recommends that 
contextualisation of the suggested “land deal power-interest clustering (LD-PIC)” and 
“legitimacy-interest-power (LIP)” frameworks to those already signed and ongoing land deals 
using real-world data is a timely matter. 
 
Key words: land acquisition; land grab; global governance; stakeholder theory; land use policy; 
inclusive model. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Large-scale agricultural land acquisitions 
 Following the food and fuel price spikes in 2007-2008, a global interest in farmlands has arisen. 
As a result, transnational land acquisitions have gained the attention of governments, 
international development institutions, media, and non-governmental organisations in recent 
years. Aspirations for capital export, demands by food importing nations to secure reliable 
supplies of food, an increasing desire for alternative sources of energy, and land speculation are 
among the factors that contributed to the increase of agricultural production (GRAIN, 2008; 
Cotula et al., 2009; Anseeuw et al., 2012; Borras et al., 2012a). Furthermore, De Schutter (2011) 
and  Azadi et al. (2013) restated the reasons behind large-scale land acquisitions as: (a) a rush 
towards alternative fuel energy extraction from agro-fuels for which developed countries have 
encouraged transnational land acquisitions, (b) increasing population and urbanisation 
accompanied by the collection of natural resource bases in certain countries, (c) access to 
freshwater (a scarce resource), (d) rising demand for raw materials from tropical countries 
(primarily fibre, wood, etc.), (e) the increasing need among companies in the developed world to 
earn certified emission reduction credits from carbon storage projects, and (f) continued 
speculation on the future market prices of farmland, regardless of location.  
 
Large-scale agricultural land acquisitions have repeatedly raised „land-grab‟ concerns and 
have resulted in the destruction of natural ecosystems and displacement of local communities 
(FAO, 2009; Deininger et al., 2011; Cotula, 2011; Azadi et al., 2013). Although the 
contemporary views on large-scale agricultural land acquisitions are contested, many of the 
arguments revolve around the disputed and evolving concept of „land grabbing‟. Many have 
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argued that „land grabs‟ target large-scale acquisition of land in Africa, Central America, and 
South and East Asia (Cotula et al., 2009; Desalegn, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2012). Others argue 
that the geographic scope of land grabbing is not only confined to the stated regions but also 
extends to such areas as the previous Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Eastern 
Europe, the Middle East, Melanesia, Australia, and New Zealand (Visser and Spoor, 2011; 
Anseeuw et al., 2012). According to Amanor (2012), the acquisition of land extends beyond the 
phenomenon of global „land grabbing‟ to the consolidation of power over the trans-regional 
value chain in particular and a component of the global „mission‟ to control food and bio-fuel 
supply chains. Others (e.g., Harvey, 2003) have conceptualised transnational land acquisitions 
within the widely evolving global capitalist development framework and the distinct 
relationships among political economies working towards the confrontation of converging global 
crises in food, energy, financial capital, and climate change (Hall, 2011; White et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, land acquisition is considered a component of the combined outcome of 
globalisation, the international upsurge in foreign direct investment (FDI), and the liberalisation 
of land markets (Zoomers, 2010). 
Land acquisitions are recommended to occur via inclusive deals that will result in a „win-
win‟ outcome (Azadi et al., 2013). Answering key operational questions in this process is 
important, i.e., Who are the players in the deal? What are their interests? How influential are the 
dealers involved? Without at least modest answers to such questions, merely advocating „win-
win‟ land deals may not result in an actual „win-win‟ situation. Land grabbing also highlighted as 
„control grabbing‟, which presages a grasping ability to control land and the accompanying basic 
resources to reap benefit from holding such resources (Peluso and Lund, 2011; Borras et al., 
2012b). This outcome is one of the manifestations of control grabbing, implying seizure of large 
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tracts of agriculturally sound land, land grab, water grab/seizure of water (re)sources (Ganho 
2011; Kay and Franco 2012) and green grabs/seizure of resources for the purpose of the natural 
environment (Fairhead et al., 2012). Understanding the groups of stakeholders and to what extent 
their interests and power influence the deal will aid in formulating inclusive and win-win land 
deals both in de jure and de facto contexts. Lessees who acquire land usually enter into land 
contracts to address their strategic business interests and deal strategically, whereas actors on the 
side of the lessor (i.e., local government, local communities, and households) may not have such 
strategic intent and power. Consequently, the need exist to integrate the “power” and “interest” 
of the dealers in acquisition of agricultural land.  
This paper first reviews the contested and evolving explanations offered for „land 
acquisition‟ and methodologies for global land acquisition, land deals, or land grabs. Second, this 
work proposes the adaptation of strategic management theories, particularly the stakeholder 
theory of strategic management, to devise tools that are essential for responsible global 
governance of transnational land acquisition. This proposal attempts to develop two inclusive 
conceptual land deal frameworks, i.e., “land deal power-interest clustering (LD-PIC)” and 
“legitimacy-interest-power (LIP)”. In addition, this approach proposes the creation and 
advancement of tripartite modelling of transnational land based on the power and legitimacy of 
the actors and the urgency of the needs that each actor strives to fulfil. Finally, this paper 
suggests issues for further review and data-based investigation. In short, this work attempts to 
contribute to the ongoing debates on how to ensure that global agricultural land acquisition is a 
more ethical and responsible investment and how to establish the power of local governance and 
local communities within the global land deal framework. Throughout this paper, the word 
“actor” is used interchangeably with “stakeholder”. 
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1.2. Land grabbing: Contested and ‘‘work-in-progress’’ definitions 
       According to a large body of literature, there is a propensity for referring to transnational 
land acquisitions as „land-grabbing‟ without setting a comprehensive definition for this term. 
What is „land grabbing?‟ The contested yet most commonly applied definition of land grabbing 
is large-scale farm land acquisition for agricultural production by non-local or foreign investors, 
whether through lease or purchase arrangements (GRAIN, 2008; Cotula et al., 2009; Mitta, 
2009). According to Borras and Franco (2010), the term „land grabbing‟ was preferably stated as 
„transnational commercial land transactions‟ because the concept includes both domestic and 
transnational deals, underscoring the commercialisation feature of transactions irrespective of the 
size and markets for production outputs. In contrast, Graham et al. (2011) described „land 
grabbing‟ as controlling and/or possessing land for commercial or industrial agricultural 
production that is not proportionate in size compared with the mean landholding in a given area, 
country, or region. According to Hall (2011), the phrase „land grabbing‟ is activist terminology 
that conceals larger legitimate or structural differences and the broad impacts of commercial land 
transactions among beneficiaries, elites, government officers, partners of different powers, and 
various intermediaries. FAO-funded studies on land grabs in Latin America and the Caribbean 
arguably stated the definition of land grabbing. Accordingly, land acquisitions are considered as 
land grabs if three conditions exist in the deals: (a) the size of the deal is sufficiently large with a 
commonly accepted threshold of one thousand hectares per deal; (b) the need exists for direct 
participation of foreign governments/companies, and (c) investment on the newly acquired land 
is expected to have a negative impact on the food security status of the host country (Borras et 
al., 2012a, b). 
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        The majority of the literature labels and characterises transnational land acquisition as „land 
grabbing‟. The characterisation of „land grabbing‟ is also notably (food) crisis-centred and 
farmland-centred as well as heavily centred on emerging players of global regimes (i.e., China, 
India, South Korea, and the Gulf states) and excessively centred on land acquisitions in Africa. 
For instance, in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean region, initiatives for food security, 
ventures for energy security, emerging strategies for mitigating climate change, and promising 
trajectories for global capital mobilisation are considered as the four key mechanisms of land 
acquisition. Land acquisition in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterised by its intra-
regional nature, i.e., many of the companies that acquired land are Latin-based and are allied 
with central state and international capital sources (Borras et al., 2012b). Consequently, it is 
important to proceed broadly from the (food)-crisis-centred definition of land grabbing, but it is 
also important not to define it too broadly. This statement leads us to address the distinct features 
of contemporary transnational land acquisition.                        
According to Mehta et al. (2012), water is both the target and driver of large-scale land 
acquisition because its hydraulic complexity poses a challenge in describing the entire process of 
water grabbing and its associated impacts on the environment and different social groups. This 
group defined water grabbing as „a situation where powerful actors are able to take control of, 
or reallocate to their own benefits, water resources already used by local communities or 
feeding aquatic ecosystems on which their livelihoods are based’ (Mehta et al., 2012: 197). 
However, it is quite difficult to determine the effects of water re-allocations, particularly due to 
inter-annual variability and surface water-ground water interactions. The absence of meaningful 
institutional linkages between water and land management has eased „encroachment‟ of the two 
resources. The existing ambiguous processes of global land and water governance have 
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intensified local-level complexities and uncertainties whereby the powerful actors in deals can 
maximise their interests through such complexities and uncertainties to the extent of expelling 
poor and marginalised people (Franco et al., 2013).  
The size or scale of land acquired is one of the points of controversy in conceptualising 
and reframing „land grabbing‟. Deininger et al. (2011), Oxfam International (2011), and 
Anseeuw et al. (2012) couched this scale as „large-scale land acquisition‟, implying deals greater 
than 1000 hectares. However, in the work of Borras et al. (2012b), land grabbing involves large-
scale land deals in two broadly interlinked but distinct dimensions of the size of land transacted 
and/or the amount of capital entailed. In addition to the size of land in deals, the amount of 
capital involved is considered in (re)defining land grabbing, a definition that is labelled as „land 
measurement-oriented accounting‟ of farm land acquisition. For example, the figures stated are 
80 million hectares in Anseeuw et al. (2012), 227 million hectares in Oxfam International 
(2011), and 45 million hectares in Deininger et al. (2011). None of these entities have stated a 
comprehensive threshold of capital that could be used to define land grabbing.  
To summarise, transnational land acquisition has passed through an evolving definition 
and conceptualisation in the literature. Many authors preferred that these phenomena were 
referred to as „land grabbing‟, a much debatable notion per se, whereas others considered this 
expression to be „activist‟ terminology. Few works in the literature have set preconditions or 
criteria for labelling transnational land acquisition as „land grabbing‟. Certain of the criteria 
considered are the size of the land in the deal, the level of participation of foreign actors, and the 
size of capital investment, although a threshold for the “size” of capital has not been stated. The 
concept is further extended to include other resources (i.e., water) and hence is known as „water 
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and land grabbing‟. The redefinition and (re) conceptualisation of these terms are pursued in the 
concept of acquiring land on transnational basis. 
 
2. Method and Theory 
2.1 Methodologies for understanding global land deals 
          „Land grabbing‟ is a hot socio-political issue throughout the world and „getting the facts 
right‟ is crucially important. To do so, it is highly important to devise effective methodologies. 
Although several global efforts have been carried out to aggregate data on land deals and 
characterise these transactions, all have struggled with methodology (Edelman, 2013; Oya, 
2013a, b; Thaler, 2013; Rulli & D'Odorico, 2013a,b; Scoones et al., 2013a). The literature has 
identified immense uncertainty with respect to what is counted and questioned the methods used 
to aggregate „land grabs‟, and hence, the need exists for development of the second phase of land 
deal/‟land grab‟ research by abandoning the aim of solely deriving aggregate amounts of land 
deals (Rulli & D'Odorico 2013a,b; Scoones et al., 2013a).  
 
         In their discussion on the „politics of evidence‟, Scoones et al. (2013a, b) argued for a 
second phase of land grab research that is free from imprecise calculations and addresses 
important questions, i.e., what is actually occurring on the ground, who are the losers and 
winners, and why. Research that can extend beyond the fixation on „killer facts‟ (i.e., those 
unproven grab numbers) and can provide statements accompanied with traceable datasets is 
sorely needed (Scoones et al., 2013b). In addition to the type and frequency of data collection, 
the question of „what type of evidence is appropriate?‟ is one of the long-running methodological 
points of debate in the global land deal discourse (Scoones et al., 2013a), and researchers must 
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think beyond qualitative versus quantitative debate. Although mixed methods/approaches are 
duly acknowledged, general rethinking of the form, reliability, medium for collection, and 
portrayal of evidence is required. Researchers must share their data in a transparent manner, 
become accountable for their findings, reach out to different audiences, and facilitate dialogue 
and debate among concerned parties (Edelman et al., 2013; Scoones et al., 2013).  
 
2.2 Extending the Stakeholder Theory to land use 
           Extensive review of the scientific literature is carried out both in the areas of transnational 
farm land acquisition and the Stakeholder Theory of Management (Freeman, 1984). The parties 
involved in both the substantial and procedural matters of transnational land deals are explored 
and categorised by extending the stakeholder theory of management to land use. Conceptual 
limitations of the usual land deal framework are identified, and points of improvement are 
solicited such that the customary binary „win-win‟ land deal framework can be rejuvenated as a 
multifaceted „inclusive‟ land deal framework. Stakeholder theory attempts to address morals and 
values in the operation of strategically driven investment ventures and was initially described in 
Freeman's (1984) work of „Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach’, which was 
followed by a number of publications in academic, research, and governance areas (Donaldson et 
al., 1995; Friedman and Miles, 2002; Jonker and Foster, 2002). The stakeholder theory was 
extended from an intra-organisational and stockholder (i.e., shareholder) framework to a 
framework of participatory planning and decision-making framework in other areas, i.e., 
corporate social responsibility (Clarkson, 1995; Hillman, 2001), ethics (Agle et al., 1999), 
information communication technology (ICT) (Pouloudi, 1999), environmental management 
(Jonker and Foster, 2002), academics and education sector management (McDermott and Chan 
11 
 
1996; Miles, 2011; 2012), public policy (Snider et al., 2003), management of construction 
projects (Bourne and Walker, 2005), health (Lim et al., 2005), and public works procurement ( 
Austen et al., 2006). Continuing the thread to the contemporary challenge of global governance 
of land grabbing (Borras et al., 2013), we introduce the application of the stakeholder theory in 
explaining the diverse stakeholders in a land deal. 
In line with the power that transnational companies wield together with the powers of 
other stakeholders, these companies (as in any type of business ventures) apply their own 
strategic techniques in pursuing their own business interests and affiliation. One of the most 
important requirements that should be considered during the business strategy-making process 
for companies is their ability to identify intra-institutional success factors. By the same token, in 
the age of global land grabbing, companies are involved in the transnational acquisition of 
farmlands, but land has a number of competing functions. The influence of other stakeholders, 
(i.e., government, local communities, international community, elites and researchers, political 
parties, etc.) is quite noticeable. In line with Mitchell et al. (1997), it is essential to cultivate a 
comprehensive mindset if a win-win transnational land deal is to be established. Inclusive 
understanding of the key actors and players and successively taking into account their interests 
and power bases aids in maintaining the efficacy of handling and managing the competitive 
interests of land use among competing stakeholders with different abilities to influence land 
deals. 
Each party in a land deal has a unique set of stakeholder(s) with which to work and likely 
a unique or similar set of reactions to a particular set of land use propositions. It is a tradition of 
land-seeking transnational companies to pay due attention to such stakeholders‟ interests (Mason 
et al., 2007). Companies use their own tactical measures to influence land deals and maintain 
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long-term viability of earnings while strengthening their power through their investment 
operations. According to McMichael (2013) and Araghi (2003), transnational acquisition of land 
is considered as “Security Mercantilism in International Relations” through which current food 
regime power restructuring is manifested within its global economic, political, and social 
coordinates.  
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1. The land deal power-interest clustering (LD-PIC) framework 
Understanding competing interpretations and political views without a comprehensive land deal 
framework to incorporate the diversified interests of land use and powers of stakeholders is a 
major challenge (Borras et al., 2013; Margulis et al., 2013). The indispensable role of strategic 
management tools in mapping possible power-interest combinations is crucial to the prevailing 
multi-polar governance challenges of transnational land grabbing. Consequently, we described 
the relevance of the „power-interest grid‟, a conceptual map that disaggregates the stakeholders, 
their vested power, and the magnitude of interests they are likely to reflect (James et al., 1986; 
Freeman, 1994; Agle et al., 1999; Ackermann and Eden, 2003) (Figure 1).  
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Fig. 1. Land deal power-interest clustering (LD-PIC) framework 
(Adapted from the strategic management literature by James et al., 1986; Freeman, 1994; 
Mitchell et al., 1997; Ackermann and Eden, 2003) 
 
This tool is supportive in narrowing down a large number of conceivable stakeholders to a 
manageable array with which to set the foundation for a win-win land deal. Focusing on the key 
actors or stakeholders with substantive procedural matters for win-win land deals is analogous to 
effective stakeholder management strategic deliverables. The LD-PIC is useful in classifying 
land deal stakeholders that take on central actor roles by supporting or sabotaging the intent of 
win-win land deals. For example, in the strategic management literature, Rowley (1997) and 
(Bronn, 2003) constructed aggregations of stakeholders into „actors‟ or „parties‟ (i.e., those 
context setters, players, and „stakeholders‟ who are neither context setters nor players but other 
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groups who have a stake in the deal or process). The LD-PIC framework can be described as one 
of the possible extensions of the Stakeholder Theory and attempts to explain and forecast multi-
agent or organisational functions with respect to stakeholder influences in the contemporary era 
of global „land grabbing‟ or transnational land acquisition. Although confusion often occurs 
relative to the theory itself, adaptation of the stated theory to real-world scenarios is important in 
developing platforms for issues that contain many interests and stakeholders with diverse 
interests and disparities of power (Miles, 2011). 
 An understanding the position and power of different stakeholders in land deals plays a 
crucial role in ensuring the accountability of companies that acquire land globally (Cotula, 
2011). Power is the potential for obtaining a desired result in relationships in which there are 
competing or opposite interests (Winkler, 2009). Although a party in a deal may hold power at a 
certain time, this does not necessarily mean that it holds that power indefinitely over time and 
space. This statement does not imply that there might not be changes in power throughout a 
given relationship (Elkin, 2007). Power also can be conceptualised as the ability of a stakeholder 
to exert influence on its survival (or interests) based on the ownership of and/or access to 
relevant resources (Winkler, 2009). However, interest is the aspiration or a feeling of wanting to 
be considered or wanting to take part in a valuable process (in this case, land and its 
accompanying resources), although selected works in the literature have labelled this as 
„urgency‟ (Agle et al., 1999). Furthermore, amalgamating the power and interest of stakeholders 
with their degrees of legitimacy is important in analyzing the stakeholders in a land deal in a 
more comprehensive manner. Legitimacy is a generalised assumption or a perception that the 
actions of a party or stakeholder are appropriate, desirable, or proper within a given socially 
constructed system of beliefs, definitions, norms, and values. Legitimacy determines whether a 
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land use claimant or stakeholder is proper, desirable, or suitable to the social beliefs, norms, and 
values used in the given context. It is also argued that the legitimacy of a stakeholder is granted 
by a given society (Agle et al., 1999). 
 
3.1.1. Low power/high interest cluster: The ‘Objects’ 
Parties or stakeholders with comparably low power but high interest can be categorised as 
„Objects‟. These entities are positioned with high interest, which could be positive or negative 
depending on their reason for existence (i.e., mission) and vision. In the conventional business 
world, mapping of all stakeholders is a strategic business prerequisite. Accordingly, this process 
selects appropriate approaches to meet unilateral or bilateral interests. To this end, the „Objects‟ 
cluster constitutes the „keep them informed‟ group, a group that has a high interest in the actions 
of the companies but holds relatively low power and requires much communication work from 
the „players‟ group (James et al., 1986; Mitchell et al., 1997). Due to their low power, these 
groups play a passive role in a land deal, and hence we refer to them as the „Objects‟, although 
they are referred to as „Subjects‟ in much of the strategic management literature (ibid). However, 
companies are not complacent, and the aggregated effect of many disgruntled stakeholders can 
grow. In a similar analogy, to incorporate or consider such parties in transnational land 
acquisitions and work for an Inclusive Land Deal (ILD) arrangement, it is crucial to encourage 
coalitions to increase the power of the members of this group and engage them in the deal 
(Bernal, 2011).  
A number of land deal cases have resulted in highly displeased stakeholders, and many of 
these situations are characterised by bi-lateral land deals that neglected a number of pertinent 
actors who were actually „powerless‟. For instance, the acquisition of land by Dominion Farms 
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(a Texas-based company) in Western Kenya resulted in conflicting land rights and land use, and 
Dominion farms was subjected to many critical investigations and reviews (FIAN International, 
2010; Galaty, 2012). In 2003, an agreement was made between Dominion and the county 
councils „to develop‟ 17,000 hectares of swampland adjacent to Lake Victoria for the duration of 
25 years with a possible extension period. During the deal, local community members who used 
the land for pasture, fishing, and crop production (especially during the dry season) were not 
considered and were treated only as „subjects‟ in the deal and received communication later in 
the process through local religious channels. The company followed legal procedures and 
negotiated with trustees, although there was severe resistance against the agreement from local 
community groups (Ochieng, 2011). Despite the fact that many blame the company for 
„grabbing‟ the land, which has livelihood importance for the local community, others named the 
government as a responsible „player‟ in the deal. A number of land use conflicts and fears 
resulted from this non-inclusive land deal, and the company has invested significant resources to 
settle local grievances, disputes, and court cases. Furthermore, an unusually long ranging conflict 
has occurred between local country councils on the subject of sharing the amount of land 
between the residents and the company (Anseeuw et al., 2012). However, local community 
groups were supported by different stakeholders and became relatively powerful in pursuing 
cases against the relevant institutions for settlement. If the company had passed through the 
appropriate steps of identification and inclusion of all relevant stakeholders together with their 
varied interests and power from the beginning of the deal, all of those conflicts might not have 
occurred. Despite the fact that the Texas-based company faced all these challenges in Kenya, it 
expanded its operation into the Taraba state of Nigeria and Liberia, where it succeeded in 
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acquiring 30,000 hectares and 17,000 hectares of land, respectively, with state backing and 
„context setting‟ (GRAIN, 2012).  
 
3.1.2. High power/high interest cluster: The ‘Players’ 
Stakeholders or parties with high power and high interest are categorised as „players‟. These 
parties are the key actors in land deals who receive much attention from the „Leaders and context 
setters‟ group. In many land deals, due focus is given to this group, followed by the „leader and 
context setters‟ cluster. The literature states that „players‟ in a deal may deliberately act via 
sabotage to fulfil their strategic aspirations, although their success or failure is meaningfully 
affected by the behaviour, position, and strategic interest of the „leaders and context setters‟ 
(Donaldson et al., 1995). Using their high power and high interest, the genuine role of „players‟ 
in transnational land acquisitions is to influence dealers to adhere to the recommended guidelines 
of corporate social responsibility and integration of environmental and social governance 
standards. Although the state is usually invoked as a key player in land acquisition, Wolford and 
Borras (2013) argued that states never function with the same voice, and hence unbundling of the 
state is argued as helpful in viewing government and governance as people, processes, and 
relationships.  
Among those real-world cases, in 2008, the Swiss-based energy company Addax 
Bioenergy obtained 14,300 hectares of land in the form of long-term lease agreements for 50 
years in central Sierra Leone. An agreement was made to produce bioenergy (i.e., ethanol) for 
export to Europe and generation of electric power for the local energy market (for energy users 
in Sierra Leone). To meet its business objective, the company reached an agreement with a 
number of powerful and interested „players‟ in acquiring the African land. The African 
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Development Bank (AfDB), the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO), the UK-
based emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF), the German Development Finance Institution 
(DEG), the Belgian Development Bank (BIO), the South African Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC), and Cordiant managed the ICF Debt Pool to provide the company a debt 
financing agreement of €142 million. Furthermore, Swedfund (the Swedish Development Fund) 
and the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO) joined the company as 
shareholders, elevating the overall size of the investment to an estimated €267 million (Addax 
Bioenergy, 2012). However, the other Swiss-based investigation group of Brot für Alle carried 
out a basic analysis of Addax‟s operations and exposed that the company would reap a return of 
US$53 million per year, which is close to 98% of the value added by the company‟s operations. 
Those stakeholders who hold high power and high interest in a deal do have high bargaining 
power, which leads them consciously or unconsciously into a suppressive and exploitative 
transaction. For example, relative to the Addax company case, its low-paid employees 
(approximately 2000) would receive only 2% of the value-added, and the owners of the land 
leased by Addax would receive approximately 0.2% of the added value. Thus, the company 
provides less than US$1 per month for each person affected by its operations or projects, 
according to a similar recent report by GRAIN (2012). Furthermore, the Government of Sierra 
Leone acted as the prominent supporter of the community resettlement plan developed by Addax 
for expansion of its sugar cane plantations.  
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3.1.3. High power/low interest cluster: The ‘Leaders and context setters’ 
The composition of stakeholders that can influence the overall context of a deal could be 
contextualised as the „leaders and context setters‟ cluster. Parties or stakeholders in this group 
must be assured with a „keep them satisfied‟ tactical endeavour for the „players‟ to fulfil their 
desired investment interests (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Gardner et al., 1986). A number of 
real-world cases can be classified into this group and are described as follows.  
The World Bank: The World Bank‟s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency supplied 
a company, i.e., Chayton Capital, with US$50 million for political risk insurance in farm 
holdings in Botswana and Zambia (GRAIN, 2012). The World Bank advocates „nine billion 
reasons‟ to invest in agriculture. Furthermore, in 2012, the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), which is the World Bank‟s private sector component, invested US$4.2 billion in large- 
and small-scale agribusiness and forestry enterprises engaged in growing food and fibre, which 
were expected to employ workers and assist in feeding the world (World Bank Group on Land 
and Food Security, 2012). However, although the World Bank is blamed for its support for „land 
grabbers‟ and for dealing with the national governments of developing countries (as „context 
setters‟), it has rejected this blame. For instance, the World Bank has rejected Oxfam‟s call to 
suspend its involvement in large-scale transnational land acquisition in developing countries, 
particularly that of Africa (World Bank, 2012): „A moratorium focused on the Bank Group 
targets precisely those stakeholders doing the most to improve practices – progressive 
governments, investors, and us. Taking such a step would do nothing to help reduce the instances 
of abusive practices and would likely deter responsible investors willing to apply our high 
standards,‟ The World Bank has officially replied (p. 4). Payne and Murrin's UK company, 
which began operating their African Agricultural Land Fund in 2007, acquired 30,000 ha of land 
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in Mozambique and other African countries with support from the Toronto Dominion Bank of 
Canada and the ISA endowment fund of Vanderbilt University (GRAIN, 2012).  
The European Union: The European Union supports „pro-land deal‟ policies. For 
instance, the EU’s ‘Everything but Arms (EBA) trade policy‟ is an agreement stating that imports 
to the EU from the least developed countries are freed from any restriction or duty, except for 
ammunitions and arms (European Commission, 2000). This component of the EU‟s trade policy 
was formulated with the intention of supporting developing countries; however, this policy could 
also indirectly encourage „land grabbing‟. Companies in Europe and other countries will go to 
developing states such as Ethiopia and acquire cheap land, cheap investments, and trade licenses 
and will ultimately benefit from the EU‟s „Everything but Arms (EBA)‟ import policy. It is a 
public fact that many companies from the EU member countries, e.g., Dutch and German 
companies, have acquired large amounts of land in Ethiopia by dismantling local communities 
who have lived on „their‟ land for hundreds of years. In contrast, the governments of developing 
countries argue that local communities are dislocated for the good reason of attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and not „land grabbing‟. This policy encourages agricultural land 
acquisition by European, Arab, Chinese, and Indian profit-oriented companies to rush for large-
scale agricultural lands in developing countries in the global South (Transnational Institute, 
2012).  
The case of the EU’s international investment policy: In bilateral investment treaties, the 
EU‟s investment policy constitutes such terms as „stabilisation‟, which are intended to immunise 
European companies from any changes made to the laws of the host countries, i.e., developing 
countries (European Commission, 2006). Accordingly, European companies are encouraged and 
even have fundamental power to influence the state laws of host countries.  
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The case of the EU’s renewable energy directive: The EU has declared that by the year 2020, the 
share of renewable energy consumption in the EU will be increased; one example is biofuel 
(European Commission, 2012). With policies of such types, we argue that the EU and related 
institutions in other intergovernmental and regional organisations are among those actors or 
“context setters” who intentionally and/or unintentionally set favourable contexts for companies 
and other actors to acquire cheap land in developing countries.  
 
3.1.4. Low power/low interest cluster: The ‘Crowd’ 
The „crowd‟ cluster constitutes stakeholders with low interest in a deal combined with low power 
to influence the deal. The „crowd‟ is a group that constitutes those stakeholders who have little 
impact on the process of land acquisition. For the „crowd‟, substantive and procedural factors 
might apply that result in their possession of low power and interest in the land. For instance, 
factors such as availability of smallholder local development schemes, direct or indirect control 
of local administrative institutions, land tenure arrangements, the location pattern of investments 
and villages, informal land transactions, etc. are among the factors that could result in certain 
local people with low power and interest at a given time (McCarthy, 2010). The cluster 
constitutes the „minimal effort‟ strategic wing of companies in designing their competitive 
business schemes, thus requiring minimal investment to win the interest of these groups 
(Mitchell et al., 1997; Bernal, 2011). These actors can be treated as potential rather than actual 
stakeholders in a land deal, and it may be necessary to raise their interest in the case of long-run 
land deals or acquisitions over a longer period of time. The „crowd‟ is the group or cluster of 
stakeholders who, at this stage, do not pose significant land-deal-related issues that require 
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further discussions compared with the other groups in the land deal power-interest clustering 
(LD-PIC) framework.  
Most non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations, certain of the 
local administrative structures, members of district or provincial legislatures, and members of 
parliament in the recipient communities of land deals are reasonably categorised in this group. 
Others, particularly those with high power, receive much attention in many of the contemporary 
land deals that occur in many developing countries. The strategy used to build capacity, generate 
interest, raise awareness, and communicate the ground-level perceived effects of investments 
plays a vital role in ensuring that this group is reactively responsive to non-inclusive land deals 
(UNCHS, 2001). However, the low level of interest and lower power of this group might change 
rapidly due to institutional, policy, governance, or demographic changes over time.  
 
3.2. Legitimacy, interest, and power of the land deal framework 
Disaggregation of the concept of „stakeholder‟ (an overused term in the transnational land deal 
literature) into a meaningful classification is an important step. A good point of departure in this 
case is the power, legitimacy, and urgency or salience model (Mitchell et al., 1997). This model 
clusters stakeholders according to business corporate performance and managerial values from 
which the legitimacy, interest, and power (LIP) modelling of parties in land deals can be 
reframed (Figure 2). The term is further extended into subcategories of potential actors in a land 
deal described as latent, discretionary, dependent, exigent, dominant, dangerous, and definitive.   
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Fig. 2. Legitimacy-interest-power (LIP) land deal framework 
 (Adapted from Mitchell et al, 1997) 
 
Inactive stakeholders hold the power to enforce their interests over others, yet they lack urgency 
and legitimacy, and hence, their power to influence deals and acquisitions remains dormant. 
Discretionary stakeholders have the legitimacy to present claims in a deal, but they are not 
interested in doing so primarily because they likely lack power or other contextual explanations. 
The exigent sub-group constitutes stakeholders with urgent claims, yet they have neither 
legitimacy nor power to enforce them in a deal. Dominant stakeholders are those with legitimate 
claims and power to influence a deal as well as resource entitlement that allow them to wield a 
stronger influence in a deal. Parties with power and interest but no legitimacy are strategically 
known as „dangerous’ stakeholders because they may opt for coercion or violence if they are not 
appropriately engaged in a deal or dissatisfied with the consequences of the deal. Dependent 
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stakeholders do not have power, although they have interest and hold legitimate claims in a deal. 
If the power of this group is improved through different capacity-building schemes, they can 
easily negotiate with other stakeholders and influence a deal or resource acquisition. Finally, 
definitive stakeholders hold the power and legitimacy to push their interests in a deal. The 
important questions are states as follows: Who are those three broader groups and the seven 
distinct clusters of stakeholders in a given land deal made in a certain country, region, or 
location? Who lacks legitimacy, interest, or power in the deal? What should be done and for 
whom such that land deals and acquisitions will end not only in a win-win outcome but also 
inclusive decisions?  
Parties or stakeholders that exhibit only one of the three characteristics (stakeholders 
numbered 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 2) might be re-categorised as latent stakeholders in such sub-
classifications as inactive, discretionary or exigent/demanding with analogies to the upper-level 
classification. Stakeholders who display two of the three characteristics (those numbered 4, 5, 
and 6) are categorically expectant stakeholders known as dominant, ‘dangerous’, or dependent, 
respectively. Those parties or stakeholders who are interested in the subject(s) in a deal, have the 
power to influence the deal, and hold legitimacy in the deal and its related matters are definitive 
stakeholders. A key issue in many of these discourses is the maintenance of an appropriate 
triangulated balance among the tripartite elements of legitimacy, interest, and power.  
An inclusive land deal (ILD) is envisioned to further address the economic, ethical, legal, and 
discretionary responsibilities or matters embedded in the different stakeholder groups and sub-
groups explained thus far. Economic inclusiveness: The „profitability of the deals‟ or businesses 
following the land acquisition should seek to generate acceptable benefit or return for the 
acquired land. Ethical inclusiveness: Responsibility exists in a land deal to cooperate in policies 
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that are fair, just, and right, and refrain from harm, i.e., the duty to choose wisely among several 
alternative uses of land and/or accompanied resources. Legal inclusiveness: This category 
includes „the legal contexts of the deals‟, which involves obeying the pertinent laws that codify 
right and wrong. Discretional inclusiveness: Companies and others who acquire land are 
expected to act as good (corporate) bodies by deploying their resources for the improvement of 
other stakeholders‟ well-being and quality of life, e.g., devoting resources to improving the 
livelihood of local communities.  
 
3.3. From ‘win-win’ to an inclusive land deal framework 
The governance of transnational land acquisition becomes a challenge in a changing international 
agricultural context with competing political perspectives and strategies, making the existing 
governance landscape more complicated (Borras et al., 2013). Land acquisitions can pose major 
threats to the livelihood of family farming and the rural poor that are ultimately disadvantageous 
to countries that supply land and therefore cast criticism on such commercial land deals (Bues, 
2011). However, certain factions believe that such investments should not be generally 
condemned. Many investors who obtain land in certain developing countries face unknown 
performance in sustainable land use and forest resources, and most do not work with local labour 
and technology, and ship their production back to their home countries (Desalegn, 2011; Dereje 
et al., 2013). From this view, such investments might endanger the amount of available food and 
increase food insecurity among the recipient communities. In particular, the large number of 
subsistence poor farmers who depend on land to feed their families will be affected by land 
scarcity and rising land prices (Azadi et al., 2013). Limited empirical studies have shown the 
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effects of large-scale land acquisitions on family farming and small-scale food production 
(Gobena, 2010; IFAD, 2011).  
Small-scale farmers or family farmers produce 80% of the food consumed in developing 
countries, but their agricultural operations are threatened and under continued upheaval due to 
land tenure, land governance, and transnational land acquisition (ILC, 2014). Family farming 
must be considered as one of the cornerstones of sustainable rural development and should be 
conceived of as an integral component of the global food value chain. Resolving the 
predicaments of family farming and harmonising this factor with large-scale land transactions is 
essential.  
           A proper identification and inclusion model for the relevant stakeholders in land deals is 
lacking, which further contributes to governance complexities and non-inclusive and selective 
participation of parties in deals that end with long-term transfer of farmlands. Win-win land 
deals can be mostly sustainable (green) deals and are hence recommended (Azadi et al., 2013); 
the conventional context of win-win deals implies that these agreements are made between two 
dealers or two stakeholders, but the main issue in the case of land deals goes beyond that 
explanation. Numerous further stakeholders exist with diverse and often conflicting interests and 
differentiated powers and aspire to play a role in given land deal, yet they are marginalised. 
However, it is not sound to develop a „one-size-fit all‟ inclusive land deal (ILD) conceptual 
model in a contemporary land (use) market that differs in various parameters of location, land 
use, crop type, and socio-political and cultural contexts (GRAIN, 2008; Akram-Lodhi, 2012). 
Furthermore, „land grabbing‟ is a „work-in-progress‟ concept according to which the inclusive 
land deal models may involve real-world cases and tailored frameworks. Inclusive land deals can 
be sustainable land deals or green deals, which are not easy to construct and hence could be 
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inevitably complex in practical terms. Win-win land ideas, as described in Azadi et al. (2013), 
are a necessary but not sufficient criterion for land deals to be characterised as sustainable or 
green deals. As green deals, land deals must simultaneously consider the systematic and 
multidirectional interactions of the biophysical environment, institutions, and stakeholders 
(Figure 3).  
 
 
Fig. 3. Sketch of the inclusive land deal (ILD) framework  
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Our proposed inclusive framework depicts an inclusive land deal as a function of three grand 
indices, i.e., biophysical environment, governance and institutions, and stakeholders, in which 
each is the focus of different areas of expertise. In short, the framework can be equated as 
follows: 
  ILD = f (bpe, gins, sths, Lu) +e; where 
  ILD: Inclusive land deal, 
  bpe: Biophysical environment, 
  gins: Governance and institutions, 
  sths: Stakeholders, 
  Lu: Land use, which is the cumulative effect of biophysical environment, institutions, and 
stakeholders, and 
  e:   Effect of latent factors 
Consideration of transnational land deals relative to the biological and physical environment that 
constitutes the flora, fauna, climatic situations, geological make-up, soil condition, infrastructure, 
and stability of the area, etc. are among the efforts considered in the inclusive deals. The ILD 
should not only protect and preserve the biophysical environment but also should be viewed 
from the context of power and interest in moving transnational capital for better benefit 
maximisation through the use of the biophysical resources of the host countries and 
communities. Transnational acquisition of land must be viewed from the broader context of 
occupying land and its accompanying resources, i.e., water for small-scale land-holding peasants 
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and local households (Ganho, 2011; Kay and Franco, 2012). Excessive focus on the land per se 
runs the risk of overlooking the basic drivers behind transnational land acquisition, i.e., greed for 
power in the global food and input supply chain and harnessing control over biophysical 
prerequisites to further capital accumulation.   
Governance and institutions are the most important variable in the ILD framework, which 
is clear but illusive in many of the contemporary land deals. Accountable, consensus-oriented, 
effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, participatory, and responsive and transparent 
governance of land use and its associated resources are prerequisites for an inclusive process in 
transnational land deals. Assessing the adherence of transnational land deals to the principles of 
accountability, transparency, and responsible agricultural investment contributes to ensuring 
sustainable land use rather than simple focus on the exchange of land ownership or land use. 
Assessment of the contexts and improvement factors related to land (i.e., policies, legislations, 
laws, directives, and market) in such an approach could aid in facilitating good governance and 
transactions of land. As discussed in the previous sections, the stakeholders must be considered, 
and their genuine participation is a requirement for inclusive deals. Protection of vulnerable 
groups, i.e., local economies, social fabric, and cultures, is also a basic need. The right to food 
and nutritional sovereignty as well as respect for the available social norms and practices are 
among the components of responsible agricultural investments. Finally, synchronising the 
interplay among the biophysical environment, stakeholders, governance, and institutions in the 
context of competitive land use is essential.  
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3.4. Adapting and refining the proposed frameworks: Checklist questions 
The need exists to bridge the gap between “generalised” and “contextualised” knowledge (and 
information) concerning transnational land acquisition. Most of the generalised 
conceptualisations and sources neglect the importance of powerless and powerful (yet 
uninterested) stakeholders in deals surrounding land use (Amanor, 2012; Anseeuw et al., 2012). 
The important questions are: Who are the three broader groups and seven distinct sub-groups of 
stakeholders in a land deal? Who lacks legitimacy, interest, or power in the deal? What should be 
carried out by whom and for whom such that land deals and acquisitions will end up with not 
only win-win outcomes but also inclusive decisions? For land deals to become inclusive resource 
use agreements and to be governed in line with meaningful environmental and social governance 
standards, these following fundamental questions should be addressed in real-world contexts, 
land use types, and socioeconomic and political settings.  
 
4. Conclusion  
Recent works on transnational land acquisition argue towards win-win land deals or „green 
deals‟ (Azadi et al 2013). However, a „win-win‟ situation is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for land deals to become inclusive or effective green deals. To obtain an inclusive land 
deal, the need exists to broaden the groups of stakeholders (i.e., in addition to the investor and 
investee) according to various but relevant parameters. By extending the evolving stakeholder 
theory of management to the emerging governance challenges of transnational land deals, we 
propose a new concept known as the land deal power-interest clustering (LD-PIC) framework. 
Stakeholders in a transnational land acquisition are categorised into either four or seven generic 
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groups depending on the power, interest, and legitimacy with which they are vested. First, 
according to the LD-PIC, actors in land deals can be categorised into four groups, i.e., subjects, 
players, leaders-context setters, and crowd. The first group of „subjects‟ are those groups of 
stakeholders with high interest in the land considered in a deal but with low power to influence 
both the process and outcome of the deal. In contrast, the second group of „players‟ are those 
stakeholders who have high power and high interest, including the designers and real actors of 
deals that use the contexts set by the third group of leaders and context setters. The leaders and 
context setters group consists of stakeholders with low interest in the deals but comparatively 
high power in influencing the context of the deal. The last yet not least group of the „crowd‟ are 
stakeholders with low power and low interest relative to land deals.  
By adapting the concept of „legitimacy‟ into our LD-PIC framework, we introduce the 
legitimacy, interest, and power (LIP) land deal framework. Accordingly, seven distinct groups of 
stakeholders are created from the context of transnational land acquisition, i.e., inactive, 
discretionary, exigent, dominant, dangerous, dependent, and definitive. Although all of these 
groups of stakeholders do exist, unfortunately, the land use agreements that have been made thus 
far have occurred between only two parties, i.e., the leaser and lessee. However, if an inclusive 
land deal is assumed, the interplay between the leaser and lessee and also among these seven 
groups of stakeholders as well as its implications for sustainable land use must be properly 
understood. Considering the systematic and multidirectional interactions of the biophysical 
environment, institutions, and stakeholders, we offer an inclusive land deal (ILD) framework. 
The framework portrays the inclusive land deal as a function of three grand variables: 
biophysical environment, governance and institutions, and stakeholders. Finally,  understanding 
and improving the theoretical realm of the ILD framework of stakeholders is a current issue, and 
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it is crucial to apply or use this framework in the further steps of assessing specific land deals, 
land use, crops, governance, institutional, and location cases.  
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